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During the Arbitration hearings on the Life Esidimeni tragedy, it 
emerged that the then-member of the executive committee (MEC) for 
health ordered the removal of 1 700 long-term mental health patients 
from state-funded care at the private Life Esidimeni facilities to 122 
community non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and to some 
less expensive state hospitals in 2016. During the process, mentally 
ill patients were transported from private psychiatric facilities ‘like 
cattle on the back of open bakkies, to ill-equipped and unlicensed 
NGOs, where unqualified staff had no idea how to care for them’.[1] 
It was reported that by the end of January 2018, 143 patients had 
died,[1] and the number may have increased since then. It was stated 
that the former MEC for health and other public health officials had 
ignored ‘protests, pleas, warning after warning, and even court action 
by activists’.[1] The former MEC, in her evidence, said: ‘I cannot carry 
personal blame because I wasn’t working for myself. I was an elected 
official’.[1] In this capacity she was ‘busy with political work’, and 
only doing ‘MEC work in between’ when the news about the deaths 
became public.[1] She maintained that it was the fault of the mental 
health director, the head of department and the project manager 
– not her. She further claimed, correctly so, that the Public Finance 
Management Act No. 1 of 1999[2] and the Public Service Act No. 103 
of 1994[3] precluded MECs from becoming involved in the day-to-day 
management of the department of health.[1] However, according 
to witnesses, she appeared to have done precisely what the Acts 
prohibited her from doing. For instance, witnesses stated that the 
former MEC was ‘fixated on cancelling the Life Esidimeni contract’. 
The mental health director and head of the department both stated 
that ‘she would not take advice from anyone and … ruled by fear’.[1] 
For instance, the head of the department said that ‘he was too scared 
to stand up to her’. The mental health director stated that she was 
merely following the orders issued by the former MEC and the head 
of the department.[1] The former MEC herself had also claimed that 
she had been forced to end the contract because of pressure by the 
Auditor General. She said that the contract ‘had not been subject 
to tender and budget constraints’. However, the MEC for finance 
said during the Arbitration hearings that there was no evidence to 
support this.[4]
MECs for health are political appointees who should not interfere 
with the day-to-day running of provincial departments of health.[2] 
Heads of departments of health are the line functionaries responsible 
for the day-to-day running.[2] The criminal and civil liability of MECs 
for health and public health officials for their intentional or negligent 
wrongful conduct leading to the deaths of patients has been dealt 
with elsewhere.[5,6] If they act with ‘eventual intention’, whereby they 
subjectively foresaw that their act or omission could kill someone if 
they did not take corrective action, they may be guilty of murder.[7] If they 
negligently fail to take reasonable steps to prevent the deaths, they 
may be guilty of culpable homicide.[6] In either instance, apart from 
any criminal sanctions – depending on the results of the Arbitration 
hearings – they could all be liable to compensate surviving mentally 
ill patients for physical and psychological harm, or the families of 
deceased patients for psychological harm.[5]
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In light of the above, the question arises as to whether, if they were 
sued civilly or prosecuted criminally, the former MEC for health, the 
mental health director, the head of the department of health and the 
project manager could use the defence of ‘superior orders’ to escape 
liability, and whether the former MEC for health could escape liability 
by blaming the mental health director, the head of the department of 
health and the project manager for the deaths.
When can subordinates escape criminal 
and civil liability for harming patients 
by raising the defence of obedience to 
‘superior orders’?
The law regarding ‘superior orders’ has only been used in criminal cases, 
but similar principles will apply to civil actions for delict.[8] A person 
may raise the defence of ‘superior orders’ provided that: (i) the order 
is given by a person who has lawful authority over the subordinate; 
(ii) there was a duty on the subordinate to obey the order; and (iii) the 
subordinate must have done no more harm than was necessary to 
carry out the order.[9] Determining whether or not the order was lawful 
is the most difficult part of the defence, because – even if the other 
elements are satisfied – subordinates do not have an absolute duty 
of obedience ‘where the order is grossly illegal’.[10] As a general rule, a 
person may not raise the defence of ‘superior orders’ if the person knew 
that the order was unlawful, or the order was ‘manifestly unlawful’, in 
which case the court may infer that the person raising it ‘ought to have 
realised the manifest illegality of the order’.[7] However, if subordinates 
can show that the superior had threatened them with harm, ‘possibly 
bodily harm or death’, if they did not carry out the orders, the 
subordinates may raise the defence of ‘compulsion’ or ‘necessity’, which 
would negate their fault.[7] 
Can the former MEC for health, the 
mental health director, the head of the 
department of health and the project 
manager escape liability for the deaths by 
raising ‘superior orders’ as a defence?
The former MEC for health claimed that she had been pressurised 
by the Auditor General to cancel the contract with Life Esidimeni 
– but there was no evidence to support this. Even if she had been 
pressurised by the Auditor General, she would have to establish the 
three criteria listed above to mount an adequate defence of ‘superior 
orders’. She is likely to fail on all three: the Auditor General does not 
have the lawful authority to tell her to transfer patients to save costs 
incurred from using private facilities if it would put patients at risk. 
There was no duty on her to obey such an order if it would lead to 
patients being transferred to unlicensed facilities with untrained staff 
that might result in their deaths. Finally, even if she did have a duty to 
obey, she would be at a loss to show that by transferring patients to 
such unlicensed facilities with untrained staff she had done no more 
harm than was necessary to carry out the order. On the contrary, she 
should have made sure that the patients were transferred to NGOs 
that were licensed, with qualified staff. In short, she would not be able 
to show that as a result of having to obey ‘superior orders’, she was not 
at fault and had acted lawfully. 
The same principles would apply to the mental health director, the 
head of department and the project manager. Despite the former 
MEC claiming that legislation prohibited her from dealing with the 
day-to-day administration of the Life Esidimeni project, the evidence 
was that she had interfered and assumed authority over it. She 
herself admitted in her evidence that in terms of the Public Finance 
Management Act and Public Service Act, she had no legal authority 
to do so.[1] Therefore, the public health officials could not claim that 
she had lawful authority over them. However, if she did have such 
authority, for the same reasons as those that apply to the former 
MEC, they also could not claim that there was a duty on them to obey 
her ‘manifestly unlawful’ orders, or that they had not caused more 
harm than was necessary, by allowing the mentally ill patients to be 
transferred to unlicensed facilities with untrained staff, which led to 
their deaths.
Can the former MEC for health escape 
liability by blaming the mental health 
director, the head of the department of 
health and the project manager for the 
deaths?
It is trite to say that the former MEC, at the time, could have been 
sued vicariously in her representative capacity for the harmful 
negligent conduct of public health officials in the department of 
health. However, when it comes to personal liability, as previously 
mentioned, the former MEC for health maintained that the Public 
Finance Management Act and the Public Service Act precluded her, 
as an MEC, from becoming involved in the day-to-day management 
of the department of health.[1] This being so, the interferences by 
her were illegal, and maybe she could be prosecuted in terms of 
both Acts. The question remains, however, as to whether under the 
common law she can escape liability by blaming the mental health 
director, the head of the department of health and the project 
manager for the deaths.
As a general rule, under the common law, a person who is in a 
position to control another person’s unlawful conduct, and who 
ought to have foreseen that a failure to prevent such conduct 
from occurring will harm another, must take reasonable steps to 
prevent such harmful occurrence from happening. If he or she 
fails to take such preventive steps, the person in control may be 
held personally liable, together with the person engaging in such 
harmful conduct, for any harm suffered by others.[8] An example is 
the case of independent contractors, where the person employing 
the independent contractor can tell the contractor what to do, but 
not how to do it. In such circumstances, the employer is not liable 
for the negligence of the independent contractor (e.g. a surgeon and 
an anaesthetist in the operating theatre),[8] unless the employer takes 
control and orders the contractor to engage in unlawful conduct.[9]
Where there is a danger to another, the courts will apply the 
ordinary principles of negligence, and consider whether the harm 
was reasonably foreseeable and preventable by the employer.[8] Here, 
direct liability rather than vicarious liability is imposed on the person 
in control. It makes no difference whether the person who assumed 
control was acting legally or illegally. Therefore, in the Esidimeni 
case, the former MEC cannot escape liability on the basis that the 
wrongful acts and omissions were the fault of her subordinates – not 
her – because she was busy campaigning for her political party and 
was only doing ‘MEC work in between’.[1] Once she directly interfered 
in the administration of the project, by ordering the transfers of 
mentally ill patients to unlicensed and unqualified NGOs and some 
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state hospitals to take place, she should have closely monitored the 
situation – especially after protests, pleas, warnings and the results of 
court action were reported to her and the other public health officials 
by activists.[1] Her failure to do so because of her duties as a politician 
was gross negligence on her part.
Furthermore, as indicated above, the subordinates who obeyed 
the unlawful orders issued by the former MEC to engage in wrongful 
conduct cannot themselves escape liability on the basis of obedience 
to ‘superior orders’ – except in very limited circumstances, if they had 
feared for their lives or were threatened with serious bodily injury.[7]
Conclusion
There was no evidence to support the claim by the former MEC for 
health that she had to cut costs in the department of health. Even if 
there was such evidence, she cannot escape liability for the deaths 
of the mentally injured patients who were transferred by raising the 
defence of ‘superior orders’. Such a defence would only apply if she 
feared death or serious bodily injury had she failed to comply – which 
is most unlikely. Likewise, the mental health director, the head of 
the department of health and the project manager cannot escape 
liability for their negligent conduct in causing the deaths of the 
patients, unless they too can show that they obeyed the orders of the 
former MEC because they feared death or serious bodily injury had 
they failed to comply – also extremely unlikely.
The former MEC also cannot escape liability for the deaths by 
blaming the mental health director, the head of the department of 
health and the project manager for the deaths, because once she 
assumed control by directly ordering the transfers of the patients 
to take place, she should have closely monitored the situation, and 
not focused on campaigning for her political party. Such conduct 
amounts to gross negligence on her part – particularly as warnings 
and complaints had been communicated to her and the other public 
health officials.
In the result, the former MEC for health, the mental health director, 
the head of department and the project manager were all guilty of 
negligence and could be charged criminally with culpable homicide.[4] 
They could also be sued civilly by the surviving mentally ill patients for 
physical and psychological harm, and by the families of the deceased 
patients for psychological harm.[12]
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